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Lot #305
[P. G. T. Beauregard]

"I believe that all that could be, has been done, under existing circumstances, to oppose the advance of Sherman's forces toward the Atlantic Coast"

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Description

"I believe that all that could be, has been done, under existing circumstances, to oppose the advance of Sherman's forces toward the Atlantic Coast"

Contemporary manuscript copy of a Civil War-dated letter from P. G. T. Beauregard to Jefferson Davis, five pages on three sheets, 8 x 10, December 6, 1864. To "His Excellency Jefferson Davis, President Confederate States," outlining preparations for the defense of Atlanta. In full: “Your letter of the 30th ulto. acknowledging the receipt of my telegram of the 24th Nov. was received by me on the road from Macon to this place. With the limited reliable means at our command, I believe that all that could be, has been done, under existing circumstances, to oppose the advance of Sherman's forces toward the Atlantic Coast. That we have not thus far been more successful, none can regret more than myself, but he will doubtless be prevented from capturing Augusta, Charleston & Savannah; and he may yet be made to experience serious loss before reaching the Coast.

On the 16th of Nov. when about leaving Tuscumbia Al[abam]a on a tour of Inspection to Corinth Miss[issippi], I was informed by General Hood of the report just received by him, that Sherman would probably move from Atlanta into Georgia. I instructed him at once to repeat his orders to General Wheeler to watch closely Sherman's movements, and should he move, as reported, to attack and harass him at all favorable points. I telegraphed to Lt. Gen'l Taylor at Selma Ala. to call on Governor Watts of Ala. and Governor Clarke of Miss. for all the state troops that they could furnish, and with all the available moveable forces of his Department to keep himself in readiness to move at a moment's notice to the assistance of Major General Howell Cobb and Major General G. W. Smith who were then at or about Griffin G[eorgi]a threatening Atlanta. I also telegraphed to Gen'l Cobb to call upon Governor Brown of Georgia & Governor Bonham of South Carolina for all the state troops that could be collected. I made all necessary preparations to repair forthwith to Georgia in the event of Sherman's executing his reported movement. On my arrival at Corinth on the 18th of Nov. having been informed that Sherman had commenced his movement, I issued all necessary orders to meet the emergency, including an order to General Hood to send one Division of Cavalry (Jackson's) to reinforce Wheeler, but this order was suspended by him, his objection being, that his Cavalry could not be reduced without endangering the success of his campaign in Tennessee, and that General Wheeler already had thirteen Brigades under his command. I finally instructed him to send only one Brigade, if he contemplated taking the offensive at once, as had already been decided upon. I then left Corinth for Macon, where I arrived on the 24th of Nov.

I did not countermand the campaign into Tennessee to pressure Sherman with Hood‘s Army, for the following reasons. 1st. The roads and creeks from the Tennessee to the Coosa Rivers across Sand and Lookout Mountains had been, by the prevailing heavy rains, rendered almost impassable to artillery and wagon trains. 2nd. General Sherman with an army, better appointed, had already the start of about 275 miles, on comparatively good roads. 3rd. To pursue Sherman the passage of the Army of Tennessee would necessarily have been over roads with all the bridges destroyed & through a devastated Country affording us subsistence or forage, and moreover, it was feared that a retrograde movement on our part would seriously deplete the Army by desertions. 4th. To have sent off the most or the whole of the Army of Tennessee in pursuit of Sherman, would have opened to Sherman's forces the richest portion of the State of Ala., & would have made nearly certain the capture of Montgomery, Selma & Mobile, without insuring the defeat of Sherman. Sth. In October last, when passing through Georgia to assume command of the Military Division of the West, I was informed by Governor Brown that he could probably raise, in case of necessity, about 6000 men, which I supposed might be doubled in a levy en masse.

General Cobb informed me at the same time that at Augusta, Macon & Columbus, he had about 6,500 local troops, and that he hoped shortly to have collected at his reserve and convalescent camps, near Macon, 2,500 men. Of these 9,000 men, he supposed about one half, or 5,000 could be made available as moveable troops for an emergency. To oppose the advance of the enemy from Atlanta the State of Georgia would thus have probably 17,000 men, to which number must be added the 13 Brigades of Wheeler's Cavalry, amounting to about 7,000 men. The troops which could have been collected from Savannah, South Carolina & North Carolina, before Sherman's forces could reach the Atlantic Coast would have amounted, it was supposed, to about 5,000 men. Thus it was reasonable supposition, that about 29,000 or 30,000 men could be collected in time to defend the State of Georgia and ensure the destruction of Sherman's Army, estimated by me at about 36,000 effectives of all arms, their cavalry about 4,000 strong, being included in this estimate.

Under these circumstances, after consultation with him, I concluded to allow him to prosecute with vigour his campaign into Tennessee & Kentucky, hoping that by defeating Thomas’ army and such other forces as might hastily be sent against him, he would compel Sherman, should he reach the coast of Georgia or South Carolina, to repair at once to the defense of Kentucky & perhaps Ohio, and thus prevent him from reinforcing Grant: meanwhile supplies might be sent to Virginia from Middle & East Tennessee, thus relieving Georgia from the present constant drain upon its limited resources.” A postscript reads: “The transfer of Hoods Army into Georgia could not have been more expeditious by Railway than by marching through the country on account of the delays unavoidably resulting from the condition of the Rail Roads." In fine condition, with scattered small stains.

Auction Info

  • Auction Title: Fine Autographs and Artifacts
  • Dates: #541 - Ended December 05, 2018