Historically significant TLS, three pages, 7 x 10.5, personal letterhead bearing a gold embossed eagle and gold embossed initials, June 24, 1970. Letter of response to General Earle G. ‘Bus’ Wheeler attempting to clarify a 1968 Joint Chiefs of Staff memo which suggested reducing American involvement in Vietnam by focusing on the training of the South Vietnamese Army as an effective counter to the Viet Cong. In full:
“My thanks for your letter of 19 June. I can understand that with your trips overseas and with retirement just ahead, you have been occupied with many professional and personal matters.
I continue to be puzzled by this matter of a program in 1968 for modernization and improvement of ARVN that, if adopted, would have left South Vietnam’s forces in a position to cope alone with both the Viet Cong threat and North Vietnamese aggression. You write that the Joint Chiefs submitted such a plan to the Secretary of Defense in ‘the spring of 1968.’ I assume that would have been in the form of a JCS Memorandum. My researchers have been unable to locate such a plan in the files here, and I would be grateful if you would send me the JCSM number and its date; better still, I would appreciate a copy of the plan itself.
You report that OSD reviewed the plan and, ‘presumably because of the price tag,’ directed the JCS to cut back the program ‘to the point where the South Vietnamese forces would be improved to the degree that they could handle effectively the Viet Cong threat.’ I would appreciate receiving a copy of the SecDef memo containing that instruction.
The records on file here, my own and those of OSD, disclose the following which seem pertinent:
--On 4 April 1968, Deputy SecDef sent the JCS a memo concerning ‘Increase in the FY 68 RVNAF Force Level.’
--JCS response to that memo was JCSM-233-68 dated 15 April describing force level increases in RVNAF.
The second paragraph states:
‘The President has expressed intense interest in and has placed great emphasis on the expansion of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) to attain a posture of self-sufficiency in the near future.’
It then described needed force level increases. It concluded, in paragraph 4: ‘This action should enable the RVNAF to become self-sufficient against a residual insurgency threat.’
A ‘residual’ threat would seem clearly to mean the Viet Cong and not the VC plus continued North Vietnamese aggression.
--The next day, 16 April 1968, Deputy SecDef sent the JCS a memo. It began:
‘We have embarked on a course of gradually shifting the burden of the war to GVN forces. We now must support as quickly as possible and to the maximum extent feasible efforts of the GVN to enlarge, improve, and modernize their armed forces.’
The OSD memo asked for the JCS for a ‘comprehensive, feasible action plan’ to achieve the objective. It assumed there might be mutual restrictions on North Vietnamese and U.S. military actions, but not that we would withdraw while North Vietnam continued its aggression.
--The JCS response was a detailed plan (JCSM-324-69) dated 23 May 1968. One of the assumptions of that JCS plan (Para. 4. d.) was that an improved RVNAF could ‘counter effectively Viet Cong operations not supported by extensive infiltration in the long term.’
--The essentials of the 23 May plan were approved by Deputy SecDef in a memo to the JCS on 25 June 1968, with the exception of some recommended improvement in VNN equipment.
--In addition, RVNAF increases recommended by the JCS in their 15 April memo were approved by Deputy SecDef in a memo of 24 May 1968.
In short, I find nothing that fits the description of a plan for ‘Vietnam-ization’ predicated on either total withdrawal of U.S. forces or on raising the capability of RVNAF to a level where they could meet both the Viet Cong and continued North Vietnamese aggression alone.
I would like to pin this down once and for all, Bus. So I would be grateful if you could have someone on your staff dig out the pertinent documents that may be missing from the files here on this matter and send them to me by the next courier if possible. I would also welcome any comments or additional interpretation you may wish to supply concerning the various documents cited above.
I was pleased to hear that you will be reviewing your papers as soon as convenient for inclusion in the Johnson Library of all those that would be significant or useful. I know they will be an important addition to this valuable historical record. My best wishes, and I look forward to hearing from you soon.”
In fine, clean condition, with staple hole and paperclip impressions to top of each page, and a couple light pencil notations. Accompanied by a copy of the letter sent from Wheeler to Johnson, dated June 19, 1970.
A growing antiwar movement had chosen LBJ as the focal point for its criticism, a public reaction that perplexed the sitting president. As he prepared his post-presidential memoirs, Johnson here turned to one of his former military advisors to clarify the identified memo regarding a plan involving the South Vietnamese armed forces. Involving the policy of “Vietnamization”—one touted by Richard Nixon after he took office in 1969—the plan encouraged the South Vietnamese to take more responsibility for fighting the war. It was hoped that this policy would eventually enable the United States to withdraw gradually all their soldiers from Vietnam.
The general here has asserted that they he made the same proposal to LBJ but the president rejected it “presumably because of the price tag.” Johnson, however, was not so sure. “I continue to be puzzled by this matter,” LBJ writes here. “If adopted [the plan] would have left South Viet Nam’s forces in a position to cope alone with both the Viet cong threat and North Vietnamese aggression.” While providing a list of what he saw as relevant information, Johnson also states that he can “find nothing that fits the description of a plan for ‘Vietnam-ization’ predicated on either total withdrawal of US forces or on raising the capability of RVNAF.” A fabulous and important letter in which the former president attempts to clarify events—and bolster his reputation—during the Vietnam War. Sadly, though he hoped to find sufficient information to vindicate his Administration’s handling of the war, Johnson died without realizing any dramatic reinterpretation of his role in Southeast Asia. Pre-certified John Reznikoff/PSA/DNA and RRAuction COA.
This item is Pre-Certified by PSA/DNA
Buy a third-party letter of authenticity for
$50.00
*This item has been pre-certified by a trusted third-party authentication service, and by placing a bid on this item, you agree to accept the opinion of this authentication service. If you wish to have an opinion rendered by a different authenticator of your choosing, you must do so prior to your placing of any bid. RR Auction is not responsible for differing opinions submitted 30 days after the date of the sale.
