Rare Design Certification Review briefing book for the AS-204 Saturn IB launch vehicle, 13 x 9.75, September 16, 1966. The preface outlines the book’s purpose: “This book contains summary information on mission objectives, operations, system verification and the spacecraft. In addition to overall spacecraft information, the spacecraft subsystem sections contain data on mission considerations (blue sheet), configuration differences (yellow sheet), problem areas (green sheet), and descriptive information (white sheets).” The binder is broken up into more than 25 tabbed sections for both aspects of the mission and systems of the spacecraft.
Several of the concerns documented throughout the book regard safety, and the “Emergency Pad Egress” section takes on a foreboding tone. It reads, in part: “Have any deficiencies in any of the emergency escape systems been uncovered?…In-flight abort procedures are straight forward…Pad egress still needs considerable thought and attention. Indications are that even under good conditions approximately five minutes will be required to exit from the spacecraft and make the descent in the elevator…The flight crew should be asked about the completeness of the emergency pad egress procedures and how well they expect to have these in hand by launch date.”
In a later “Problem Areas” page in the structural systems section, the report notes: “Item: Emergency egress through hatches in 90 sec must be demonstrated. Description: Three hatches must be opened. Inner hatch hard to open with pressure differential. Interfaces with access arm on tower. Comments: Egress tests underway on 007. Test on 012 planned at KSC.” Another problem area addressed comes in the “Support and Restraint” section: “Item: Fire Hazard. Description: Velcro patches, nylon straps and couch pads are considered combustible materials in pure oxygen atmosphere. Comments: Walk through of 012 accomplished at KSC to reduce combustible material and isolate from electrical cables. Couch pad covers added for fire resistance.” While these specific notices stand out in hindsight, the manual also includes numerous schematics and diagrams in addition to similar reports on problems and changes for all spacecraft subsystems. A memo in the front of the binder outlines the distribution of the report and indicates that this specific volume was distributed to A. N. Kontaratos. In fine condition.
Issued some four months before the deadly Apollo 1 fire, this document identifies two of the leading factors that led to catastrophic loss of life in the accident: the difficulty of opening the pressurized cabin door and the large amount of inflammable material inside. The Apollo 1 fire took place during a routine test of the spacecraft's internal power systems that had been deemed non-hazardous because pyrotechnic systems were disabled and neither the launch vehicle nor the spacecraft were loaded with fuel or cryogenics. However, the capsule was pressurized with pure oxygen, which was itself a hazard as the combustible components within the cabin essentially became kindling in the oxygen-rich environment. In the aftermath of the tragedy, investigators found that Edward White had followed the emergency procedures in place and attempted to open the hatch, but was not able to do so against the internal pressure—an item that had likewise been addressed in this report. The fire forced substantial changes to the design of the Apollo spacecraft, including the use of self-extinguishing materials and a modified hatch that could be opened outward within thirty seconds. It also led to a new era of accountability within the Apollo program. Overall, this is a remarkable historical document that lends insight into NASA's processes in the days leading up to fateful Apollo 1 test.
