ALS in French, signed “Metternich,” 12 pages both sides, 8 x 9.75, July 30, 1822. Metternich writes to Lord Strangford, the British Ambassador at Constantinople regarding the pacification of the Ottoman Empire, in which Metternich tells the ambassador that Russia has announced evacuation of certain Turkish principalities as a start toward negotiations with Turkey to renew their relations. He agrees with Strangford that Turkey has no excuse if it does not proceed with the evacuation in good faith and without delay. He feels that Emperor Alexander (of Russia) shows great moderation in insisting only an evacuation as a starting point to improving relations between Russia and Turkey. Metternich discusses the question of amnesty as a pre-requisite to a lasting peace. Future Russian missions to Constantinople, he says, must be guaranteed safety from new revolts. He suggests the Turkish government will find this humiliating, and thus Strangford must convince them their sovereignty is not being challenged. He finally reminds Strangford that the pacification of the Ottoman Empire is the first and indispensable condition for the final unraveling of these grim complications. A few small areas of separation at the folds, mounting tape to the right edge of each page, and scattered light toning and soiling, otherwise fine condition.
Two days prior to this correspondence, the Greeks achieved a monumental victory over the Ottoman forces in the quest for independence at the Battle of Dervenakia. After Dramali Pasha's forces had been trapped on the Argolis, they made a belated retreat into the Dervenaki. On July 26, the Turkish light cavalry was routed as it tried to claw their way out of the ravines on foot and were cut down by sharpshooters. He then tried to retreat through Agionori but encountered Greek forces commanded by Nikitaras and Ipsilantis. The Greeks wiped out virtually all of his unmounted army with only 6,000 of 23,000 troops surviving the battle. While the destruction of the Turk army saved the Greek march to independence, it created a political and diplomatic nightmare for Metternich.
His biggest concern was how to handle a partition of the fallen Ottoman Empire and still maintain "a balance of power" as achieved in the Concert of Europe. Russia had been on the brink of going to war with the Turks over the hanging of the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church of which Alexander I regarded himself as defender of the church. To prevent Russia from siding with the Greeks, Metternich aimed to improve Russian-Turkish relations for which he enlisted the British in a common goal to deal with the "Eastern Question." At the time of this letter, both British and Austrians were negotiating with the Porte in Vienna to meet the Russian demand to remove the Ottoman army from "certain Turkish principalities."
In these documents, he agreed with Strangford that "Turkey has no excuse if it does not proceed with the evacation in good faith and without delay." To sweeten the deal, Metternich discussed the possibly of "amnesty as a pre-requisite for lasting peace." Of prime importance to Metternich was Russia's missions which had to "be guaranteed safety from new revolts." He suggested to Strangford that his role was "to convince them that their sovereignty is not being challenged" though "the Turkish government might find it humiliating." In the end, the Turks did not budge on the evacuation, however, common ground was found and the Russians won some concessions. The danger of war passed and the Greek Revolution was denounced. RRAuction COA.
